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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
SECURITIES REGULATION
SECRET SWISS BANK ACCOUNTS AS A MECHANISM FOR
VIOLATING UNITED STATES SECURITIES LAWS:
AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS ,
In recent years there has been increasing concern about the
widespread use of the secret Swiss bank account by United States
citizens seeking to evade United States securities statutes and regu-
lations. 1
 Several court cases,' news articles,' and other reports' have
prompted speculation that the use of Swiss accounts to evade securities
laws is increasing. The possession of a Swiss bank account is ap-
parently quite fashionable,5
 and advertisements in financial news-
papers offering information regarding their acquisition and use are not
uncommon.' United States citizens familiar with the use of the secret
Swiss bank account are even selling their knowledge to others.? The
1 See generally Hearings on SEC Enforcement Problems Before a Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as SEC Enforcement Hearings]; Hearings on S. 594, S. 1168, and S. 1601 Before a
Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957)
[hereinafter cited as SEC Legislation Hearings]; Hearing on Legal and Economic Impact
of Foreign Banking Procedures on the United States Before the House Comm. on Bank-
ing and Currency, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Banking
Hearing].
Secret Swiss bank accounts are also being used by United States citizens for other
illegal purposes not discussed in this comment, including tax evasion, gold speculation, and
the "cleansing" of stolen money. The latter activity is accomplished by depositing illegally
acquired funds in a Swiss bank. The bank may then "lend" the money back to the
depositor. Such a loan is termed a "window dressing" loan. See id. at 10.
It should also be noted that banking secrecy is not unique to Swiss banks. Countries
such as Panama, Curacao and the Crown Colony of Hong Kong have secrecy laws;
however, it appears that the Swiss banks are more widely used by persons engaged in
illegal activities. See id. at 31-32 (remarks of Robert Morgenthau, U.S. Att'y, S.D.N.Y.).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965) ; United States v.
Coggeshall & Hicks, 69 Crim. 431, Indictment (S.D.N.Y., filed May 16, 1969) ; United
States v. Bolin, 69 Crim. 336, Indictment (S.D.N.Y., filed April 11, 1969) ; United States
v. Arzi Bank, A. G., 68 Crim. 1011, Indictment (S.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 19, 1968).
3 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1969, at 42, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1969 at 1,
col. 8; Nobody Here But Us Foreigners?, Forbes, May 1, 1969, at 24; Plugging
a Dollar Drain, Business Week, Dec. 21, 1968, at 78; Wechsberg, Banking by the Num-
bers, Playboy, Aug., 1968, at 79; McInnes, Haven for Capital, Barron's, June 17, 1963,
at 9.
4 See, e.g., 115 Cong. Rec. 875 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1969) (remarks of Representative
Patrnan); 115 Cong. Rec. 1459 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1969) (remarks of Representative
Patman).
5 See, e.g., T. Fehrenbach, The Swiss Banks 5 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Fehrenbach]. "Switzerland and its banks hold a great fascination. No one can deny that
the anonymous or numbered account has become both the most subtle and the most
sophisticated status symbol in the modern world." Id.
See, e.g., Barron's, Aug. 11, 1968, at 10, col. 4.
7 See, e.g., A. Gibson, Swiss Bank Accounts and Financial Survival in Inflation and
Devaluation (1969) [hereinafter cited as Gibson]; F. Pick, The Numbered Account (2d
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holding of such accounts is no longer confined to wealthy financiers
and investors; ordinary businessmen also possess Swiss bank ac-
counts.8 The problem has reached such proportions that Congress
is currently considering the enactment of remedial legislation, 9 and
the State Department is presently engaged in treaty negotiations
with the Swiss Government."
Statistics indicate that Swiss financial institutions have pur-
chased American securities quite beyond what one would expect
from a nation with a relatively small population and limited financial
resources. Data compiled by the banks and brokers in the United
States and forwarded to the Treasury Department and Federal Re-
serve Board for tabulation and evaluation shows that Swiss activity
in American securities markets is far greater than that of any other
foreign nation." For example, 31 percent of the total gross purchases
in long-term securities" made in the United States by foreigners" in
1968 were attributable to Switzerland." Also, 49 percent of the total
European gross purchases of long-term securities in the United States
were made by Switzerland.15 This latter figure compares with 18.4
percent for the United Kingdom," the second largest purchaser, and
8.3 percent for France," the third largest purchaser. Switzerland also
led all other nations in gross sales of long-term securities made in the
United States by foreigners in 1968 with 27.4 percent of the total.'
ed. 1969) thereinafter cited as Pick]. Although Pick's book is only fifty pages,
its retail price is $35. However, it is instructive in that it exhibits typical contractual
forms and agreements that the Swiss Bank and depositor execute when an account is
being opened.
8 Foreign Banking Hearing 11 (remarks of Robert Morgenthau).
1) See id. at 44-45 (remarks of Representative Patman).
10 Letter from Robert M. Beaudry, Country Director, Italy-Austria-Switzerland,
Department of State to B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev., October 9, 1969, on file in the Review
office.
It is a fact that discussions are under way between the Swiss and the United
States Government for the purpose of determining . whether we can develop a
Judicial Assistance Agreement to facilitate the gathering of evidence in certain
criminal cases before the U.S. courts.
Id.
11 See, e.g., Treasury Bull., July, 1969, Capital Movements Section, at 90-126.
12 "Long-term securities" are defined as obligations with no .maturity date or an
original maturity greater than one year. Id. at 90.
13 The term "foreigner" covers all institutions and individuals domiciled outside
the United States including United States citizens domiciled abroad and the foreign
branches, subsidiaries, and offices of United States banks and business concerns. It also
includes the central governments, central banks, and other official institutions of foreign
countries, wherever located. Finally, it includes persons in the United States to the ex-
tent that they are known by reporting banks and brokers to be acting on behalf of
foreigners. Id.
14 Id. Table 10, at 124. This table is partially reproduced on p. 196.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id .
12 Id.
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Fifty-one percent of the European total gross sales in long-term secu-
rities were Swiss."
The 1968 statistics also reveal that most of the Swiss investments
in the United States were concentrated in corporate stocks." Switzer-
land's gross purchases of United States corporate stock were 57
percent of the European total," while the United Kingdom was
second with 10.5 percent of the European total. 22 Fifty-nine percent of
the European total of gross sales of corporate stock was attributable to
Switzerland,' while only 13.5 percent was attributable to the United
Kingdom?' The foregoing statistics do not merely reflect a situation
unique to 1968. It appears that the amount of Swiss activity in United
States securities markets has remained at a remarkably high level for
the past decade."
While these statistics indicate a large Swiss investment in United
States securities, they do not necessarily indicate that this invest-
ment is beneficially owned by United States citizens who are at-
tempting to evade the securities laws. Swiss banks are renowned for
their stability and are universally considered safe depositories for
large sums of money." Swiss banking officials are reputed to possess
a great deal of investment expertise. 27 Finally, the United States
securities markets are very attractive to the Swiss banks, and they
have undoubtedly chosen to invest a large amount of their own
funds in American securities. Taking into consideration these factors,
Switzerland's percentage of foreign investment in the United States
is still extraordinarily high. Other reasons have been posited to
account for these statistics, and the conclusion has been reached
16 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 id.
24 Id.
25 See, e.g., Treasury Bull., April, 1968, Table 8, at 103; Treasury Bull., Dec., 1967,
Table 8, at 108; Treasury Bull., Dec., 1966, Table 8, at 113. These sources set forth the
figures for purchases and sales of long-term securities made by foreigners in the United
States for the calendar years 1967, 1966, and 1965. Swiss activity in United States
securities markets during these years was consistently higher than other European na-
tions. Only Canada approached the Swiss totals on occasion, but, unlike the Swiss, most
Canadian investment was not concentrated in American corporate stocks. Moreover, it
may be of some significance to note that the 1968 statistics show a marked increase
over the 1967 statistics in Swiss purchases and sales of long-term securities in the United
States. In 1967 Swiss purchases and sales were approximately 3.5 and 3 billion dollars
respectively. Treasury Bull., April, 1968, Table 8, at 103. In 1968 the respective figures
were approximately 6.7 and 5.3 billion dollars. See notes Il & 14 supra. Swiss investment
activity in the United States was also disproportionately high in 1957. SEC Legislation
Hearings 129 (remarks of M. Joseph Meehan, Director, Office of Business Economics,
Dept. of Commerce).
26 Pick 32-33. Pick also notes that "freedom from persecution," "hedging against
nationalism" and "protection against arbitrary taxation and/or confiscation" are prime
advantages of maintaining a Swiss account. Id. at 34-35.
27 Gibson at 37-38 (by implication).
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that United States citizens are utilizing Swiss banks accounts to
violate United States securities laws."
It is not difficult for a United States citizen to open a Swiss
bank account. A Swiss account can be opened by a United States
citizen in Switzerland," the United States" or in other countries
in close proximity to the United States." Some Swiss banks have
representatives in the United States who can confidentially arrange
for the opening of a Swiss account, including the transfer of funds
to Switzerland." Some Swiss bank representatives, cognizant of the
fact that Swiss accounts are being used for illegal purposes, have
openly solicited United States citizens with criminal records." The
relative ease of opening a Swiss bank account, when considered with
the statistical data evidencing the large investment by Swiss banks
in United States securities, and a number of recent court cases showing
actual abuses, indicate that United States citizens are using Swiss
accounts for illegal purposes.
The fact that United States citizens are violating the securities
laws by using Swiss bank accounts is in itself troublesome, but the
serious impact which such violations have on the United States
securities markets and economy is alarming. The confidence of the
investing public in these markets is being diminished, and market
stability is being affected as a result of stock manipulation, fraud and
evasion of registration requirements made possible by transactions
through secret accounts. As legitimate investors recognize the in-
ability of law enforcement officials to solve this problem, they might
find the United States securities markets a less attractive medium
for making investments. This lack of confidence may seriously
weaken the viability of the economy. The attainment of the primary
objective of the securities laws, establishment of a free and open
market for trading in securities, will be thwarted as long as these
violations continue. It is manifest that present legal resources of the
SEC and the Justice Department are insufficient to curb these
abuses.
This comment will explore the current abuses of United States
securities statutes and regulations' resulting from the use by United
States citizens of the anonymous Swiss bank account." The nature
28 Foreign Banking Hearing 11-17 (remarks of Robert Morgenthau) ; id. at 7 (re-
marks of Fred M. Vinson, Jr., Ass't Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice) ; id. at 18 (remarks of
Irving M. Pollack, Director, Div. of Trading and Markets, Securities Exchange Com-
mission).
29 Pick 15.
30 Gibson 41.
81 Foreign Banking Hearing 15 (remarks of Robert Morgenthau). These coun-
tries include the Bahamas, Mexico and Canada.
32 Gibson 41-43.
33 Foreign Banking Hearing 11 (remarks of Robert Morgenthau).
34 See pp. 203-11 infra.
35 Most Swiss bank. accounts are not truly anonymous. Generally, a - few top offi-
cials of the bank know the name of the holder of a secret account. Although it is possible
for a Swiss bank to legally accept deposits from an unknown person, only rarely
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of Swiss banking secrecy" and the resulting enforcement problems
of the SEC and the Justice Department 37 will also be discussed.
Finally, various responses and solutions to the problems presented by
the Swiss account will be considered and evaluated."
I. SWISS BANKING LAWS
In order to fully understand the use by United States citizens
of Swiss bank accounts, it is instructive to examine the origin and
applicability of Swiss banking secrecy laws. 39 Swiss banking laws
protect the owner of a Swiss bank account from disclosure to third
parties by the bank of information concerning the account." The Swiss
have historically considered the privacy of bank accounts a funda-
mental right." By 1912 a custom had firmly developed whereby
Swiss banks were refusing to divulge any information regarding
their clients' accounts." In 1934 this practice was codified by Article
47 of the Swiss Banking Law," which provides as follows:
Whosoever as agent, official, employee of a bank, or as
accountant or accountant's assistant, or as a member of the
Banking Commission, or as a clerk or employee of its secre-
tariat, violates the duty of absolute silence in respect to a
professional secret, or whosoever induces or attempts to
induce others to do so, will be punished with a fine of up
to 20,000 francs, or with imprisonment of up to six months
will a bank accept large deposits without knowing the owner's name. See Friedrich, The
Anonymous Bank Account in Switzerland, 79 Banking L.J. 961, 970 (1962).
• 39 See "Swiss Banking Laws."
37 See pp. 211-14- infra.
See pp. 213-27 infra.
39 For a thorough explanation of Swiss banking secrecy, see Friedrich, supra note
35; Meyer, The Banking Secret and Economic Espionage in Switzerland, 23 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 284 (1955); Comment, Swiss Banking Secrecy, 5 Colum. J. of Transnat'l L.
128 (1966); Union Bank of Switzerland, Swiss Federal Banking Law (1968); Swiss
Credit Bank, Banking Secrecy in Switzerland.
40 Friedrich, supra note 35, at 961.
41 Id. at 964.
42 Fehrenbach 54.
The custom of banking secrecy which has developed in Switzerland is basically
attributable to the Swiss penchant for personal independence in financial and political
matters. During the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, Switzerland's neutrality was a great
attraction to many refugees fleeing from the political and social turmoil of neighboring
European countries. To insure the protection of these refugees, the custom of banking
secrecy was strengthened.
43 Swiss Credit Bank, supra note 39, at 1-2; Friedrich, supra note 35, at
964. In 1934 several factors influenced the Swiss to codify banking secrecy: (1)
pressure from Nazi agents seeking to recover assets of German and Jewish refugees;
(2) the private remedy available to an account holder for breach of banking secrecy
was considered insufficient, for the evidence uncovered by this breach often led to a
criminal conviction of the account holder; and (3) the high regard for financial privacy
shared by the Swiss. See Comment, Swiss Banking Secrecy, supra note 39, at 128 n.l.
The codification was not motivated by commercial considerations, "e.g., protecting
the valuable business of administering foreign 'hot money,'" Friedrich, supra note 35, at
964.
199
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
or both. If such an act is due to negligence, the penalty
shall be a fine not exceeding 10,000 francs.'" (Emphasis
added.)
Although this statute does not specifically refer to Swiss bank
accounts, the words "professional secret" have been interpreted to
cover matters involving the banker-client relationship 4a Article 47
prevents all banks from providing any information to third parties,
including Swiss revenue authorities, concerning the financial affairs
and business connections of their clients." The proscription also
applies to foreign governments, such as the United States, seeking
information from Swiss banks concerning their nationals. 47 A banker
who fails to abide by this obligation is not only subject to criminal
sanctions but is also subject to civil liability."
Anyone who attempts to induce banking personnel to violate the
duty of professional secrecy also becomes subject to the sanctions of
Article 47, including, it would seem, agents of foreign governments.
In fact, it has been asserted that the primary purpose behind the
enactment of Article 47 was to protect Swiss banks from foreign
espionage."
Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code provides additional pro-
tection to owners of Swiss bank accounts. It states:
Whosoever explores trade secrets in order to make them
accessible to foreign governments or foreign enterprises or
foreign organizations or their agents, and whosoever makes
such trade secrets accessible to foreign governments or or-
Another commentator gives the following reasons for the enactment of secrecy
laws:
First, it put Switzerland on record before the world and its governments:
foreign deposits would be protected. Second, it protected the banker, and gave
him a legal as well as moral code to stand by:. he was ordered not to talk, and
punished if he did. Third, and too many outsiders overlooked this, the codification
of bank secrecy satisfied many fears among native Swiss about their own govern-
ment as well. Few Swiss ever really trusted the bureaucrats they employed in
Bern.
Fehrenbach 62.
44 This translation of Article 47 appears in Fehrenbach at 64. For other translations
with only minor variations, see Comment, Swiss Banking Secrecy, supra note 39, at 129;
Union Bank of Switzerland, supra note 39, at 17-18; Meyer, supra note 39, at 289-90.
Until the enactment of Article 47, professional secrecy was considered
the secrecy of the classical professions, namely, those of the clergy, the lawyers
and the physicians . . . The use of that term in Article 47 of the Banking Act
together with the introduction of criminal sanctions seemed to justify the conclu-
sion that the legislature intended to guarantee the clients of a bank full protection
against violation of their secrets.
Id.
45
 Meyer, supra note 39, at 290.
45
 Union Bank of Switzerland, supra note 39, at 1-2.
47
 Meyer, supra note 39, at 290.
48 Comment, Swiss Banking Secrecy, supra note 39, at 130. Civil liability is pro-
vided by Article 28 of the Swiss Civil Code.
49
 Meyer, supra note 39, at 290.
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ganizations or private enterprises or to agents thereof, will
be punished by imprisonment	 (Emphasis added.)
Article 273, unlike Article 47, is concerned only with the dis-
closure of information to foreign governments. While Article 47 ap-
plies only to banks, Article 273 applies to commercial, manufacturing
and industrial enterprises as well as banks. The term "trade secret"
has been interpreted by the Swiss judiciary to inclUde "any fact which
the person in possession of it considers worth keeping secret."" More-
over, the Swiss courts have ruled that all information concerning
bank accounts is included within this definition."
It is apparent, therefore, that these two provisions of Swiss law
tend to inhibit United States law enforcement officials seeking to
collect evidence concerning violations of United States securities laws.
Moreover, the experience of the SEC and the Justice Department
clearly demonstrate that Swiss banking laws are often the only ob-
stacle preventing the indictment and prosecution of United States
citizens using the banks for illegal purposes."
There are, however, limitations to the Swiss banking secrecy
laws." The Swiss Constitution has reserved to the Swiss cantons the
exclusive right to decide procedural questions." Since the cantonal
courts try most cases," and since the competency of witnesses is con-
sidered a procedural matter," the cantonal procedural codes will gen-
erally determine if a banker must testify in court regarding an ac-
count." It must be noted, however, that these cantonal procedural
codes are effective only to the extent they do not conflict with Swiss
Federal substantive law. 59 While some of the cantonal codes disqualify
bankers from testifying, most of the codes leave the question of corn-
60 Fehrenbach 64. Another translation of Article 273 states:
Whoever, through searching, secures a manufacturing or business secret, in
order to make it accessible to a foreign official agency, or to a foreign organiza-
tion, or to a private enterprise, or to their agents,
whoever makes accessible a manufacturing or business secret to a foreign
official agency, or to a foreign organization, or to a private enterprise, or to their
agents,
shall be punished by imprisonment, in serious cases in the penitentiary. In
addition a fine may be imposed. (Emphasis added.)
Letter from Rudolph Stealer, First Secretary, Embassy of Switzerland, Washington,
D.C. to B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev., Oct. 3, 1969, on file in the Review office.
51
 Friedrich, supra note 35, at 964.
52 Fehrenbach 64; Friedrich, supra note 35, at 964.
53 Foreign Banking Hearing 9 (remarks of Fred M. Vinson, Jr.).
" See generally Comment, Swiss Banking Secrecy, supra note 39, at 132-35;
Swiss Credit Bank, supra note 39, at 4-6.
55 Meyer, supra note 39, at 291-92. Despite the exclusive reservation of power in
procedural matters, the Swiss federal system operates similarly to the United States
federal system in that inconsistent cantonal law is superceded by federal law. Id. at 291.
56 Id.
trf Id. at 292.
58 Id.
59 See note 55 supra.
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petency to the discretion of the cantonal court.'" In the latter situation,
the cases in which a banker may be required to testify are usually
limited to those involving violations of Swiss criminal law or those
which concern bankruptcy proceedings, debt collection, family law
and the law of inheritance." The disclosure of banking information
in these types of cases is not considered a violation of Swiss banking
secrecy legislation. In criminal cases the banker may disclose only
information concerning the defendant. Information concerning persons
indirectly affected by criminal judicial proceedings may not be dis-
closed."
These same limitations on banking secrecy laws extend to foreign
governments with which Switzerland has judicial assistance treaties."
When the banking information is being sought in connection with a
criminal case, however, no legal cooperation will be forthcoming un-
less the offense involved is identifiable with and punishable under a
provision of the Swiss criminal legislation." Furthermore, the re-
quested assistance must not violate Swiss constitutional principles."
When foreign governments, such as the United States, seek bank-
ing information in connection with a criminal investigation, they are
often denied assistance by Swiss banking authorities. The Swiss will
not cooperate in such investigations unless the matter, had it oc-
curred in Switzerland, would be considered a violation of Swiss crim-
inal law. For example, the Swiss treat domestic tax matters and
currency regulations as fiscal matters; such questions are handled ad-
ministratively and are not prosecuted under Swiss criminal law." In
these administrative proceedings the Swiss banks are obliged to refuse
information to Swiss tax and exchange control authorities." Conse-
quently, the Swiss Supreme Court has directed that a foreign govern-
ment also may not be assisted in investigations concerning tax and
currency matters despite the fact that the foreign government deems
the offense involved a crime."
When the United States, therefore, seeks information from
Swiss banks concerning a violation of United States laws, the Swiss
courts must be satisfied that the information sought is not merely a
fiscal matter." When rejecting requests by foreign governments to
examine bank records or during negotiation of a legal cooperation
treaty, the Swiss have explained their refusal to cooperate in fiscal
60 Meyer, supra note 39, at 292.
61
 Swiss Credit Bank, supra note 39, at 5-6.
62 Id. at 6-7.
63
 Comment, Swiss Banking Secrecy, supra note 39, at 134. Although experience
has shown that the existence of a treaty will expedite judicial assistance, Switzerland has
extended assistance to countries with which it has no treaty. Id.
64 Swiss Credit Bank, supra note 39, at 7.
63 Id.
66
 Friedrich, supra note 35, at 963 (tax matters); Foreign Banking Hearing 23
(remarks of Fred M. Vinson, Jr., on currency regulations).
67 Friedrich, supra note 35, at 963.
68 Fehrenbach 65; Friedrich, supra note 35, at 963,
06
 Friedrich, supra note 35, at 963.
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matters by stating that if they did so, foreign governments' would
have powers within Switzerland not even possessed by Swiss author-
ities."
In light of the administrative treatment of tax and currency
matters in Switzerland, the question arises whether violations of
United States securities Jaws would also be considered fiscal matters.
If so considered, the Swiss banking laws will apply and the banks and
courts will not cooperate. This is a difficult question because only
one of many aspects of a fact situation may be fiscal in nature.
Whether that aspect alone is sufficient to make the entire case a fiscal
matter under Swiss law is unclear and has not been answered by the
Swiss courts. Conversely, if only one aspect of a foreign case is con-
sidered criminal under Swiss Iaw, it is uncertain whether this is suffi-
cient to bring the case within the judicial exception to Articles 47 and
273. In order for the SEC and the justice Department to obtain as-
sistance from Swiss banking authorities, it appears that the securities
statute or regulation violated would have to be identifiable with a
similar provision under Swiss law. Since Switzerland does not pres-
ently have criminal securities laws, 71
 it is unlikely that a violation of
United States securities law would be identifiable with another Swiss
criminal statute. However, if the investigation concerns both a viola-
tion of the United States securities laws and a violation of another
criminal statute which would also be considered a violation of Swiss
criminal law, it is possible that this latter identity would be considered
sufficient to enable Swiss authorities to divulge banking information.
Unfortunately, most situations in which the United States has sought
information from Swiss banks have involved circumstances where
there has not been an analogous criminal statute in Switzerland."
II. SWISS BANKS AND THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES LAWS
As a result of the enactment of Swiss banking secrecy laws,
United States citizens who wish to conceal transactions which consti-
tute violations of the securities statutes and regulations have found
Swiss banks an attractive medium for masking their transactions.
Although it is theoretically possible for a United States citizen to vio-
late many sections of the securities laws and regulations, it appears
that Sections 5 and 17 of the Securities Act of 1933," Sections 7, 10,
70 Id. at 962.
71 N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1969, at 62, col. 1.
During the 1968 congressional hearings on foreign banking practices, the question
arose whether margin requirements would be considered fiscal matters in Switzerland.
"As to margin requirements, that is in a gray area. I am sure there would be some who
would take the position that that is fiscal and administrative and not criminal, even
though it is criminal under our laws." Foreign Banking Hearing 23-24 (remarks of
Fred M. Vinson, Jr.).
72 The possibility of a treaty being negotiated which would exempt some United
States securities laws violators from the protection of the "fiscal matters" concept will be
discussed at p, 215 infra.
73 15 U.S.C. i$ 77a et seq. (1964).
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14 and 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 74 and certain regu-
lations passed pursuant thereto, have been, or could be, subject to
the greatest abuse.
Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 75 prohibits a person from
using the mails or other instruments of interstate commerce to sell
or to offer to sell securities unless a registration statement has been
filed. Section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933" makes it unlawful for
any person to utilize the instruments of interstate commerce to de-
fraud, make untrue statements, omit material facts, or to otherwise
deceive a purchaser with respect to any security offered for sale. By
74 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (1964).
75 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964) provides:(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be un-
lawful for any person, directly or indirectly
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or com-
munication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through
the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate com-
merce, by any means or instruments or transportation, any such security for
the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or com-
munication in interstate commerce or of the mails to carry or transmit any
prospectus relating to any security with respect to which a registration statement
has been filed under this subchapter, unless such prospectus meets the require-
ments of section 77j of this title; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate com-
merce any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale, unless
accompanied or preceded by a prospectus that meets the requirements of sub-
section (a) of section 77j of this title.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate com-
merce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium
of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has
been filed as to such security, or while the registration statement is the subject
of a refusal order or stop order or (prior to the effective date of the registration
statement) any public proceeding or examination under section 77h of this title.
76 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964) provides in part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any security by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of any means or instruments
of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the
mails, to publish, give publicity to, or circulate any notice, circular, advertise-
ment, newspaper, article, letter, investment service, or communication which,
though not purporting to offer a security for sale, describes such security for a
consideration received or to be received, directly or indirectly, from an issuer,
underwriter, or dealer, without fully disclosing the receipt, whether past or pro-
spective of such consideration.
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using Swiss banks to shroud their illegal transactions, American prin-
cipals have been able to violate Sections 5 and 17 of the Securities
Act and to realize large profits at the expense of the investing public.
For example, in United States v. Kelly .' the defendants were tried
and convicted of crimes relating to the sale of millions of dollars worth
of unregistered securities of Gulf Coast Leaseholds, Inc., an oil com-
pany "engaged in limited exploratory and development work."78 Gulf
Coast's income was derived, and its expenses were incurred, mainly from
the purchase and sale of non-producing properties. Two of the de-
fendants were American promoters who owned controlling interests
in the oil company. They, with others, including members of an in-
vestment newsletter service, were charged with conspiracy to sell Gulf
Coast stock in violation of Sections 5 and 17 of the Securities Act. 7°
The American promoters established "Liechtenstein trusts" 8° to
conceal the fact that they were involved in the stock fraud. The trusts
purchased large blocks of Gulf Coast stock at very low prices through
secret Swiss bank accounts. Subsequently, the investment newsletter
service made fraudulent advertisements which greatly exaggerated the
resources, income and potential of Gulf Coast." As a result of such
fraudulent manipulation, Gulf Coast stock rose from less than $1 per
share to approximately $16, whereupon the American promoters,
through their "Liechtenstein trusts" and the secret Swiss bank ac-
counts, liquidated their holdings. Shortly thereafter, the stock fell
drastically in price and the innocent purchasers of Gulf Coast suffered
heavy losses.
Although it eventually became apparent that Sections 5 and 17
of the Securities Act were violated, it was exceedingly difficult for
United States authorities to discover that American citizens were the
promoters of the transactions.82
 In fact, if one of the conspirators had
77 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966). This case, pop-
ularly known as the Gulf Coast Leaseholds case, was mentioned before the Foreign
Banking Hearing by Robert Morgenthau as a prime example of how Swiss banks have
been utilized by Americans to conceal illegal securities activities. Foreign Banking Hear-
ing 12-13. See also Fehrenbach 120-22.
78 349 F.2d at 730.
79 Specifically, the defendants were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964).
80 For the characteristics and advantages of Liechtenstein trusts and foundations,
see Gibson 43-48. One of the features of transacting business in Liechtenstein is that
its banking laws closely resemble the secrecy laws of Switzerland. Id. at 44.
81 One bulletin falsely advertised "that each of the 1.4 million shares outstanding
is backed by over $35 of oil; a truly amazing sum for so young a producer" and that
"Gulf Coast Leaseholds is believed capable of climbing to as high a price as $50 per
share within the intermediate period." 349 F.2d at 744.
82 Speaking before a congressional committee, Robert Morgenthau pointed out the
difficulties encountered in investigating the Gulf Coast stock conspiracy:
[Blefore the indictment, the Swiss lawyer who ran two of the trusts, filed
affidavits with governmental authorities conducting the investigation, stating
that these trusts were not owned or controlled by Americans, even though he
knew that these affidavits were false. When cross-examined about the affidavits
., at trial, he took the position that his duty to his American clients obligated him
to make these false statements. As a result, the promoters of the stock fraud,
during the period of the SEC's initial investigation, were able to use the Swiss
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not divulged the details of this fraudulent activity, it is unlikely that
the Government could have successfully convicted the two United
States citizens.'
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 84 and Rule
10b-5" adopted thereunder make it unlawful for any person by the
use of the mails or interstate facilities to commit a fraudulent act in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 86 As in Kelly,
secret Swiss bank accounts could be used to shield the identity of
United States citizens who violate section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.'
Another regulation adopted under section 10(b) which is subject to
abuse is rule 10b-6. 88 This rule prohibits trading in a security by per-
sons interested in its distribution and deems such an act a "manipula-
tive and deceptive device" contrary to the provisions of section
10(b)." Persons interested in a distribution of securities include an
secrecy laws as a shield behind which they could operate anonymously. By the
time the secrecy had been dispelled, the public had been bilked of millions of
dollars.
Foreign Banking Hearing 13.
83
 Id, at 12.
84 15 U.S.C. § 78; (1964) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
85
 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
88 Section 10(b) and rule 106-5 differ from Section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933
in that the former apply to fraudulent purchases and sales while the latter applies only to
fraudulent sales.
87 See, e.g., United States v. Dolin, 69 Crim. 336, Indictment (S.D.N.Y., filed April 11,
1969), where the defendants use Swiss banks to conceal a scheme to defraud the Realty
Equities Corporation of New York and its stockholders. Defendant-Deutsch was an officer
of the corporation and conspired with defendant-Dolin to arrange the assignment
and transfer to a Swiss bank of the corporation's rights in a certain promissory note and
warrants at a price much lower than market value. The defendants arranged for the
Swiss bank's repurchase of the note and warrants from the promissee. The defendants
then arranged for the Swiss bank to sell the notes and warrants to another corporation
at a price substantially higher than the price which the Swiss bank had paid. The profits
of the sale accrued to one of the defendants who had owned a secret Swiss account.
Swiss banking secrecy enabled the defendant to camouflage his interest in the trans-
actions. Both defendants were eventually indicted for a violation of rule 10b-5. Id. at 7.
88 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1968).
89 Rule 10b-6 provides in part:
(a) It shall constitute a "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" as
used in section 10(b) of the act for any person,
(1) Who is an underwriter or prospective underwriter in a particular dis-
tribution of securities, or
(2) Who is the issuer or other person on whose behalf such a distribution is
being made, or
(3) Who is a broker, dealer, or other person who has agreed to participate
or is participating in such a distribution, directly or indirectly, by the use of
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underwriter, an issuer, broker, and a dealer. Such persons easily
evade rule 10b-6 by channeling their purchases through secret Swiss
bank accounts.
Another section of the Securities Exchange Act which has been
abused by means of the secret Swiss bank account is Section 14."
Section 14(a) makes it unlawful to solicit proxies in violation of the
SEC's proxy rules.' Rule 14a-11, 92 established pursuant to section
14, requires participants" other than the issuer in proxy contests to
file with the Commission and the appropriate securities exchange on
which the stock involved is registered a statement, Schedule 14B, 94 in
which certain information must be included. The identity and back-
ground of the participant must be disclosed as well as any legal or
beneficial interests which the participant has in the issuing corpora-
tion." Also, rule 14a-3" states that no solicitation subject to the
proxy rules may be made unless each person solicited is furnished
concurrently or previously a written proxy statement containing the
information specified in Schedule 14A.97 This schedule requires, among
other things, disclosure of any "substantial" interest of the solicitors."
In an election of directors, the solicitor must list the nominee's bene-
ficial holdings in the issuer or a parent or subsidiary of the issuer."
The purpose of section 14(a) and the regulations is to prevent a per-
son from gaining or maintaining control of a corporation unless he
discloses his interests in the corporation. In order that the stockholder
may have adequate knowledge as to the manner in which his interests
are being served, it is essential that he be enlightened with respect to
the person or persons who are seeking control of the corporation.
Solicitors in proxy contests have evaded these regulations by conceal-
ing, through secret bank accounts, their interests in the issuer cor-
poration.'" Often, a Swiss bank will hold record ownership of the
securities, and, on authorization of the account owner, solicit and vote
proxies on his behalf. -
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange, .. . to bid for or purchase
for any account in which he has a beneficial interest, any security which is
the subject of such distribution, . . . or to attempt to induce any person
to purchase any such security or right until after he has completed his par-
ticipation in such distribution....
Id.
90 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964).
91 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964).
92 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(c)(1) (1968).
93 For the definition of a participant, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(b) (1968).
04 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-102 (1968).
95 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-102, items 2 and 3 (1968),
96 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1968).
97 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1968).
98 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, item 4 (1968).
99 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, item 6 (1968).
100 SEC Legislation Hearings 178 (remarks of Senator Frank J. Lausche). In
the past Swiss hanks have been used by financiers secretly attempting to gain control of
American corporations. However, it is generally true that the larger Swiss banks do not
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Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Ace"' has also been evaded
through the use of secret Swiss accounts. Section 16(a) 102 requires
"insiders" (directors, officers, and certain principal shareholders of a
corporation) to file with the Commission and with the exchange on
which the securities are registered statements concerning their bene-
ficial ownership in the issuer corporation. A statement is required
when a person initially becomes an insider, or when a corporation
in which a person is already an insider registers on an exchange.
Finally, an insider is required to report monthly any changes in his
beneficial ownership of stock in a corporation in which he is an in-
sider.'" Section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act.'" further requires
that, in order to prevent the unfair use of inside information, any
profit realized by an insider from the purchase and sale of securities
involved within six months thereof shall inure to the benefit of the
issuer corporation. Civil suits to recover such profits not returned to
the issuer may be instituted by the issuer or by a stockholder on the
issuer's behalf."'
The foregoing provisions of the Securities Exchange Act can
easily be evaded by an insider who conceals beneficial ownership of
his securities in a secret Swiss bank account. In United States v.
Orovitz,'" the defendant was the director and treasurer of a corpora-
tion and exercised control, through his own holdings and those of his
wife, over nearly 10 percent of one of its debenture issues worth over
$12 million. At trial it was established that the defendant himself
was the beneficial owner of $250 thousand of these debentures, and
that he had taken advantage of his inside information, which in-
cluded knowledge of an impending change in management, to effect
a sale of his interests. He was able to conceal his beneficial ownership
of the securities by maintaining their record ownership in the name of
a Swiss bank. The Government was able to prove that Orovitz owned
the securities despite the fact they were held in a Swiss account. Oro-
vitz was convicted for violating Section 16(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act by wilfully failing to file a monthly report.
willingly allow themselves to become engaged in American proxy fights. In fact, the
Swiss Banker's Association has advised the Swiss banks to vote stock held by them
only in favor of management proposals. Comment, Swiss Banking Secrecy, supra note
39, at 135; Fehrenbach 125.
101 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1964).
102 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964). This section provides in part:
Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10
percentum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security)
which is registered on a national securities exchange, or who is a director or an
officer of the issuer of such security, shall file ... a statement with the exchange
(and a duplicate original thereof with the Commission). . .
103 To comply with this requirement, the insider must submit Form 4. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.16a-1(a) (1968).
104 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
105
 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
100 United States v. Orovitz, 66 Crim. 485, Indictment (S.D.N.Y., filed 1968). A
partial transcript and the sentence appear in Foreign Banking Hearing 55-61.
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Section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act' has been subject
to abuse not only by United States citizens but also by the Swiss
banks themselves. Section 7, in order to prevent the excessive use of
credit for the purchase or carrying of securities, authorizes the Federal
Reserve Board to prescribe margin requirements."' The Federal Re-
serve Board adjusts the margin requirements periodically and has
promulgated Regulations T,'°0 U,11°
 and G,'" which stipulate the
amount of credit that brokers, banks, and others who extend credit
on certain securities may supply on a retail leve1. 113 Presently the mar-
gin rate is 80 percent of the purchase price." 3 United States citizens
have utilized Swiss banks to evade these margin requirements.'"
Swiss banks and other foreign financial institutions, unlike banks
in the United States, perform for their customers many services which
are handled only by brokers in this country." 5 Because of the broker-
age functions they perform, the Swiss banks come within the definition
of "brokers" and "dealers" as set forth in the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.1 " As a result, Swiss banks, like other American brokers,
have been able to transact their securities business in the United States
using the "special omnibus account."'" This account provides for an
exemption from the general margin requirements of Regulation T, and
allows a member of a securities exchange to make wholesale transac-
tions"' for other brokers, including Swiss banks, without regard to
margin requirements. Brokers and Swiss banks utilizing this type of
account must certify that they are not extending credit to their cus-
tomers except in accordance with Regulation T." 9
 Thus, at present,
107 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1964).
	 •
108 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1964). "Margin" refers to the minimum amount of cash
which a customer must supply when purchasing securities on credit. The purpose of
margin requirements is to restrict the aggregate amount of national credit resources
directed into stock market speculation and to thereby insure a balanced use of credit
resources in commerce, industry, and agriculture. See 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 22,011,
at 16,052; H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934).
100 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1969).
no 12 C.F.R. § 221 (1969).
111 12 C.F.R. § 206 (1969).
112 Retail level refers to transactions between a broker and any ordinary customer.
This is to be contrasted with transactions between broker-dealers and members of a
national securities exchange which would constitute business on a wholesale level. Some
wholesale transactions, those involving the use of the special omnibus account, are
exempt from margin restrictions imposed on the retail level.
113 SEC Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.8(a) (1969); SEC Reg. U, 12 C.F.R. § 221.4(a)
(1969) '- SEC Reg. 0, 12 C.F.R. § 207.5(a) (1969).
114  See Foreign Banking Hearing 13 (remarks of Robert Morgenthau) ; id. at 18-19
(remarks of Irving M. Pollack).
113 Foreign Banking Hearing 19 (remarks of Irving M. Pollack).
118 Id. Section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines the terms "broker"
and "dealer." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (4), (5) (1964).
irr Foreign Banking Hearing 19 (remarks of Irving M. Pollack). The original
definition of "special omnibus account" is found in 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(b) (1969). This
definition has, however, been changed. See 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(b) (1970), and pp. 220-22
infra.
118 See note 112 supra.
119 See Foreign Banking Hearing 19 (remarks of Irving M. Pollack).
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any broker using the "special omnibus account" who extends more than
20 percent credit to a customer on any transaction violates the Regu-
lation.
Most American brokers who abused the "special omnibus ac-
count" by violating the retail margin requirements could be detected
since they were registered with the SEC."' Swiss banks, however,
have not had to register with the SEC, and this fact, coupled with their
banking secrecy laws, gave them the ability to ignore the margin re-
quirements at the retail level."' The fact that margin requirements
have been relatively high in recent years has led to speculation that
Americans might be obtaining excessive and illegal credit from Swiss
banks.'
In United States v. Coggeshall & Hicks 123 it was established that
Americans were evading margin requirements. Coggeshall & Hicks, a
New York brokerage firm, was indicted for participating in a scheme
with the Arzi Bank of Zurich 124 enabling customers to purchase secur-
ities on a margin as low as 20 percent. The Arzi Bank had opened a
"special omnibus account" with the brokerage firm. It then conspired
with Coggeshall & Hicks to permit customers and members of the firm
who had secret accounts with the bank to escape margin restrictions.
Knowledge of the customers' identities and the transactions made on
their behalf were kept secret by placing and executing securities orders
in the name of the Arzi Bank. It was estimated that nearly $20 mil-
lion worth of registered securities were purchased on the basis of
illegal credit extensions through the Arzi Bank's "special omnibus
account." These undermargined transactions enabled the brokerage
firm to earn over $250 thousand in commissions. Coggeshall & Hicks
was charged with, and eventually pleaded guilty to, violations of Reg-
ulation T.
On July 8, 1969, Regulation T was revised in an effort to prevent
such schemes as perpetrated by the Arzi Bank and Coggeshall &
Hicks. 126 The prerequisites for using the "special omnibus account"
were changed by this revision. The probable effectiveness of the new
regulation in preventing Swiss and other foreign banks from allowing
United States citizens to avoid margin requirements will be discussed
later in the comment. 126
The current and potential abuses of the securities statutes and
regulations resulting from the use of secret Swiss accounts by United
120 In fiscal 1959, for example, 170 brokers were found to be violating the margin
provisions of Regulation T. See 25 SEC Ann. Rep. 107 (1959).
121 See Foreign Banking Hearing 19 (remarks of Irving M. Pollack).
122 Foreign Banking Hearing 10.
123 69 Crim. 431, Indictment (S.D.N.Y., filed May 16, 1969).
124 See United States v. Arzi Bank, A.G., 68 Crim. 1011, Indictment (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Dec. 19, 1968).
125 12 C.F.R. § 220.4 (1970). For a detailed explanation of this amendment, see
Current CCII Fed. Sec. L. Rep, V 77,717, at 83,639-645 (press release of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, June 6, 1969).
126 See pp. 220-22 infra,
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States citizens are evident. They have been used to violate or evade
the registration, antifraud, insider and margin provisions of United
States securities statutes and regulations. Congress therefore is clearly
justified in concerning itself with the influence of Swiss banking prac-
tices on the American economy and in increasing the law enforcement
capabilities of the SEC.
Once it has been recognized that securities laws are being violated,
the problem becomes one of detecting the violators. Considering the
impact of these illegal activities on the stability of and public confi-
dence in United States securities markets,' effective detection and
prosecution of violators becomes essential. Measures must be taken to
prevent such injuries to the investing public as came to light in United
States v. Kelly.
III. ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS
The ability of the SEC and the Justice Department to enforce
the securities laws is affected by two factors. The first factor is the
impediment presented by the Swiss banking secrecy laws themselves.
Second, the continuing attractiveness of Swiss banks to some United
States citizens may outweigh any deterrent effect which the conviction
of other citizens might have.
The usual and the easiest way for the SEC to detect a securities
law violation is to trace the series of transactions that transpire when
a customer purchases stock.'' If, however, a Swiss financial institu-
tion is involved in one or more of the transactions, the identity of
those persons beneficially owning or illegally profiting from the trans-
actions cannot be determined.129 Thus, the evidence necessary for a
successful prosecution is, in effect, witheld by Swiss secrecy.
The records maintained by United States brokers are often not
very helpful in tracing transactions involving Swiss banks. In many
cases the banks will buy securities without disclosing for whch ac-
count it is acting. It is not only impossible to determine the identities
of persons using Swiss bank accounts, but it is also impossible to as-
certain whether or not the Swiss banks may be buying or selling
securities for a coded account. 13°
Also complicating the SEC's job in obtaining competent evidence
concerning transactions involving Swiss banks is the ease with which
money can be transferred to a secret account." False names are often
given by depositors and the identity checks of depositors by United
States banks transfering money to Swiss accounts are generally not
very rigid.' 32 Thus, a United States citizen attempting to violate the
securities laws could easily deposit a large sum of money in a Swiss
127 See p. 198 supra.
128 See SEC Enforcement Hearing 44-45 (remarks of SEC Chairman J. Sinclair
Armstrong) ; Foreign Banking Hearing 9 (remarks of Fred M. Vinson, Jr).
129 Id.
ia0 Foreign Banking Hearing 12 (remarks of Robert Morgenthau).
1 :11 Id. at 15. See p. 198 supra.
132 Id.
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bank by using an American bank as a conduit. By merely giving a false
name to the American bank, a person often will prevent his identity
from being ascertained in a later investigation. As mentioned earlier,
Swiss banking secrecy laws prevent the extraterritorial discovery of
evidence. On occasions when the SEC and Justice Department have
sought to elicit information from the Swiss, either directly or through
the State Department, these federal agencies have been informed that
Swiss law prohibits the disclosure of information by Swiss banks in
fiscal matters.'" This inability to obtain Swiss bank records often
renders prosecution arduous or even impossible. 134 As the origin, codi-
fication, and significance of banking secrecy in Switzerland clearly
indicate, Swiss refusal to cooperate with American investigators is
not motivated by malice toward the United States.'" Nonetheless,
without Swiss cooperation, the SEC can determine the identities of
violators of the securities laws only by inference, circumstantial evi-
dence or through a confession of one of the parties involved in the
transaction.'"
The SEC and Justice Department occasionally overcome the
problem of obtaining evidence when Swiss banks are involved, thus
increasing the chances of securing a prosecution and conviction. How-
ever, these cases are believed to represent a very low percentage of
the violations perpetrated through secret accounts. 137 Such a belief is well
founded considering the many advantages of Swiss banks to the pur-
suit of unlawful profits in securities. Not only can unlawful activities
be screened behind the banking secrecy laws, but also profits emanat-
ing from these activities are easier to hide from the IRS.' Further-
133 SEC Enforcement Hearings 45 (remarks of J. Sinclair Armstrong).
134 Even in cases where we can successfully prosecute, it is necessary to spend
thousands of man hours in piecing together complex and seemingly unrelated
transactions in order to obtain indirectly information that banks will not directly
furnish us. But naturally, we have received virtually no cooperation from the
foreign banks which hold the evidence of crime. Often we have had very com-
plete information on criminal activity, but have been unable to prosecute
because the foreign bankers would not furnish witnesses competent to introduce
their banking documents into evidence. As a result it should be obvious that the
increasing number of successfully prosecuted criminal cases represents only a
small fraction of crimes committed by Americans through secret foreign ac-
counts.
Foreign Banking Hearing 11-12 (remarks of Robert Morgenthau).
135 See pp. 199-203 supra.
138 Foreign Banking Hearing 13 (remarks of Robert Morgenthau); SEC Enforce-
ment Hearings 45 (remarks of J. Sinclair Armstrong).
137 See note 134 supra.
138 it should be noted, however, that Americans do not completely escape United
States taxation by using Swiss accounts. The 1951 Tax Agreement between Switzerland
and the United States imposes a tax of 15% on dividends received from American
corporations. If the holder of the securities is an American citizen, the Swiss bank with-
holds another 15% which is forwarded to the I.R.S. Significantly, however, capital
gains are not subject to withholding by Swiss banks. Convention with the Swiss Con-
federation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income,
May 24, 1951, [1951] 2 U.S.T. 1753, T.I.A.S. No. 2316 (effective October 1, 1951).
See also p. 216 infra.
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more, these profits may then be used to speculate in precious metals,
a practice which is severely restricted in the United States. As a result
of  such speculation, the securities laws violator would have a hedge
against continuing inflation in the United States and the possibility
of future devaluation of the dollar.' When these considerations are
added to the safety and stability of Swiss banks and the expertise of
their investment managers, it is apparent that the few prosecutions
and convictions which have taken place will have limited deterrent
effect.
In order to better understand the problem of enforcement, it is
instructive to examine a case involving Swiss banking secrecy which
was settled only after protracted litigation. Societë Internationale pour
Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers' illus-
trates the problems of obtaining competent evidence and bringing a
case to a speedy conclusion when a Swiss bank is used to conceal the
beneficial ownership of securities. I.G. Farbenindustrie (Farben), a
giant German chemical and die company, cognizant of the poor Ger-
man image among Americans following World War II decided to
disguise its holdings in a United States corporation, General Aniline
and Film. To conceal its ownership of General Aniline stock, Farben
created a Swiss holding company, I.G. Chemie (Interhandel), to which
it transferred its holdings in General Aniline. Interhandel thereby
acquired record ownership of 90 percent of the stock of General
During World War II, the Alien Property Custodian of
the United States, suspecting that General Aniline was owned by
German nationals, seized pursuant to Section 5(b) of the Trading
With the Enemy Ace" assets of the company consisting of $100 mil-
lion cash and about 90 percent of its capital stock.
In 1948, Interhande1 143 brought suit against the Attorney General
as successor to the Alien Property Custodian"' to recover the seized
assets of General Aniline on the ground that these assets were owned
by nationals of Switzerland, a neutral country during the war, and
not by nationals of Germany. Upon the motion of the Attorney General
the district court ruled, pursuant to Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure,145 that Interhandel must produce a large number of
139 For arguments why investments made through Swiss banks provide protection
against inflation and devaluation, see Gibson 10-29.
140 357 U.S. 197 (1958), noted in 46 Calif. L. Rev. 836 (1958); 107 U. Pa. L. Rev.
103 (1958).
141 See Fehrenbach 213-36 for a detailed account of the expansion of Farben and
the behind the scenes activities of its directors which led to the formation of Interhandel.
142 40 Stat. 415 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (1964).
148 In 1945 I.G. Chemie, in an effort to improve its image abroad, changed its
name to French-Societ6 Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. The new French name translated in German as Interhandel, and it was by this name
that the Swiss holding company became more commonly known. See Fehrenbach 229.
144 Suit was initiated pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Trading With the Enemy
Act. 40 Stat. 419 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 9(a) (1964).
145 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 provides in part:
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice to
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banking records held by H. Sturzenegger and Cie, a Swiss banking
firm alleged to have collaborated with LG. Chemie and Farben in
camouflaging the ownership of General Aniline. 146 The records were
seized, however, by the Swiss Federal Attorney to prevent violation
of Swiss banking laws which would have occurred if the bank had
divulged the information. The District Court for the District of Colum-
bia then dismissed the case for non-compliance with its production
order.' After the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia af-
firmed,'" the Supreme Court reversed and held that Interhandel had
made a good faith effort to comply with the production order, and that a
trial on the merits was possible."' Meanwhile, Switzerland, acting on
behalf of Swiss minority stockholders who had never known that Inter-
handel had been controlled by Farben, sought a decision on the case in
the International Court of Justice. 16° The International Court refused
to hear the case because remedies in the United States had not been ex-
hausted.'" The case was eventually settled in 1964, the settlement
providing that Interhandel and the United States would share the
proceeds from a public sale of the General Aniline stock. 162
Although this case involved a Swiss company attempting to re-
cover assets the beneficial ownership of which was concealed by utiliz-
ing Swiss banks, instead of the usual case of the United States Govern-
ment seeking to pierce Swiss secrecy to obtain evidence of a securities
law violation by a United ) States citizen, it exemplifies the protracted
and internationally sensitive character litigation involving Swiss banks
can assume. It further demonstrates the difficulties encountered by
the United States when its discovery orders conflict with Swiss bank-
ing secrecy laws, and shows the lengths to which the Swiss Government
will go to maintain the integrity of banking secrecy laws. Thus, the
differences between the Swiss and United States legal systems are a
major obstacle to the SEC's efforts to successfully prosecute United
States securities laws violators.
other parties, . .. the court in which an action is pending may (1) order any
party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by
or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence relating to any of the matters within the scope
of the examination permitted . . . and which are in his possession, custody, or
control. .
146 Societe Internationale, etc. v. Clark, 9 F.R.D. 263, 267 (D.D.C. 1949).
147 Societe Internationale, etc. v. McGrartery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 448 (D.D.C. 1953).
The dismissal, however, was stayed for three months. Id.
148 Societe Internationale, etc. v. Brownell, 243 F.2d 254 (D.D.C. 1957).
145 357 U.S. at 212-13. On remand, however, the case never came to trial. Fehrenbach
233.
155 Fehrenbach 233,
151 Interhandel Case, [19591 LC .J. 6.
152 For details of the settlement, see Societe Internationale, etc. v. Kennedy, Civil
No. 4360-48 (D.D.C., filed April 15, 1963) as cited in 3 Int'l Legal Materials 428 (1964).
The public sale was finally held in March, 1965. Fehrenbach 235.
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IV. PRIOR PROPOSALS
Several recommendations have been made to increase the power
of the SEC to prevent violations of securities laws by United States
citizens using secret Swiss bank accounts. These recommendations in-
clude the negotiation of a judicial assistance agreement facilitating
the collection of evidence in criminal matters pending before United
States courts, amending the present securities laws, and changing
domestic banking practices to aid the SEC in obtaining evidence.
A number of factors must be considered in the evaluation of the
potential success of any solution. First, it is necessary that the pro-
posal be effective in aiding the SEC and the Justice Department obtain
evidence of securities laws violations while reflecting practical con-
sideration of the problems of enforcement. Second, any proposal should
attempt to mitigate untoward international political and economic ef-
fects. Third, the costs and time required to implement and administer
the plan should not be prohibitive.
A. Treaty
When congressional committees in 1957 and 1968 investigated
the effect of Swiss financial institutions on the ability of United States
citizens to violate securities laws, hopes were expressed for a treaty
with Switzerland providing for cooperation in the detection of United
States securities laws violations.' Preliminary negotiations with
Switzerland regarding this problem occurred in April, 1969; 1" addi-
tional discussions with the Swiss are currently taking place." As of
September, 1969, little progress has been made toward the affectuation
of a treaty.'
This reported lack of progress is understandable. The Swiss will
not compromise their banking secrecy laws in order to help the United
States detect violations of its securities laws. When the Swiss Federal
Council157 was questioned in June of 1969 with regard to measures
153 See SEC Legislation Hearings 16, 53 (remarks of J. Sinclair Armstrong) ;
Foreign Banking Hearing 23 (remarks of Fred M. Vinson, Jr.).
154 Letter from Rudolph Stettler, First Secretary, Embassy of Switzerland, Wash-
ington, D.C., to B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev., October 3, 1969, on file in the Review office
with enclosure in which the Swiss Federal Council answered a question of Mr. Ziegler,
member of the Swiss National Council, concerning treaty discussions.
155 Letter from Robert M. Beaudry, Country Director, Italy-Austria-Switzerland,
Dept. of State, to B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev., October 9, 1969, on file in the Review office.
156 "Representatives of State, Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission
are involved in these negotiations and it is reported that little progress was made."
Letter from Representative Wright Patman, Chairman, Comm. on Banking & Currency
to B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev., Sept. 8, 1969, on file in the Review office.
157 The Federal Council is the executive body of the Swiss national government.
It is composed ,of seven members elected for four-year terms by the national legislature.
No more than one member can be from the same canton. One member of the Council
is chosen annually to act as president of Switzerland. The other two major organs of
the Swiss government are the Federal Assembly (or national legislature) and the Federal
Tribunal. 26 Encyclopedia Americana 147-48 (1961).
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which the Federal Council intended to take to facilitate legal cooper-
ation between the United States and Switzerland, that governmental
body's reply included the affirmation that "Nile principle that Swit-
zerland will not render assistance in fiscal matters will be adhered
to.""8 The Federal Council also simplistically observed that the United
States is principally responsible for the prosecution of crime in its
own territory,'" thereby implying that too much reliance should not
be placed on the Swiss government to assume what was essentially an
internal duty of the United States.
In 1951 the United States executed a treaty with Switzerland
for the avoidance of double income taxation.'" One article of this
treaty provides for the mutual exchange of information."' Its pro-
visions are limited, however, by the following clause: "No information
shall be exchanged which would disclose any trade, business, industrial
or professional secret or any trade process."'" (Emphasis added.)
It should be noted that the terms "trade" and "professional secret"
are used both in the treaty and in the Swiss banking laws. The fore-
going treaty provision was obviously insisted upon by the Swiss to
insure the inviolability and integrity of Article 47 of the Swiss Banking
Law and Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code.
Another clause in the 1951 treaty restricting mutual exchange of
information provides:
In no case shall the provisions of this Article be con-
strued so as to impose upon either of the contracting States
the obligation to carry out administrative measures at vari-
ance with the regulations and practice of either contracting
State or which would be contrary to its sovereignty, security
or public policy or to supply particulars which are not pro-
curable under its own legislation or that of the state making
application."'
This clause prevents the United States from obtaining information
from Swiss banks where the disclosure of such information violates
the laws and policy of Switzerland. The administrative handling of
fiscal matters in which banking secrecy is applicable is, as previously
mentioned, a basic policy in Switzerland. This clause, then, insures
that this practice is not varied by the treaty. Since Swiss authorities
are unable to procure banking information in "fiscal matters," the
clause prevents the United States from obtaining banking information.
Despite the strict Swiss banking secrecy laws, international legal
cooperation is still possible. Since there are exceptions to the secrecy
158 Letters from Rudolf Stettler, supra note 154 (enclosure).
165 Id.
160 Convention with the Swiss Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Tax-
ation with Respect to Taxes on Income, May 24, 1951, [1951] 2 U.S.T. 1753, T.IAS.
No. 2316 (effective October 1, 1951).
161 Id. at 1760. (art. VXI(1)).
in Id.
1' Id. at 1760-61 (art. XVI (3)).
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laws in criminal and certain civil cases,164 a treaty solution to the prob-
lem of securities law violations should not be ruled out. In a 1936 case
the Swiss cooperated with a foreign government seeking banking in-
formation. There, a Viennese prosecutor was allowed, pursuant to a
mutual cooperation treaty executed in 1896 between Switzerland and
Austria-Hungary, to visit Switzerland to investigate a citizen of Aus-
tria-Hungary who had become bankrupt and had removed his assets
from his own country and concealed them in a Swiss bank to defraud
Austrian creditors. 165 In order to trace the assets, authorization was
given to the prosecutor by a Zurich Cantonal Court to examine the
records of the bank in which the assets were secreted. The Zurich
Procedural Code did not consider the business secrets of bankers in
the same category as those of doctors, lawyers, and clergymen. There-
fore, the banker in whose institution the bankrupt had his account
was required to testify. It is likely, however, that the facts of this
case fall within one of the exceptions to Swiss banking secrecy laws,
because defrauding creditors was a criminal offense in Switzerland as
well as in Austria.
Whether the Swiss can be induced to negotiate a legal assistance
treaty in which at least some violations of securities laws would not
be protected by the "fiscal matters" concept is uncertain. However,
while it is unlikely that they will compromise their secrecy laws, the
Swiss also have an interest in preventing stock fraud and diminished
confidence in the United States securities markets which accompany
such defalcations. As the 1968 statistics revea1, 155 the Swiss investment
on Wall Street is considerable. Much of that investment undoubtedly
results from honest transactions, some of it representing funds owned
by the Swiss banks for their own accounts. These legitimate invest-
ments are jeopardized when United States citizens utilize Swiss banks
for illegal purposes. Because the Swiss have a substantial interest in
the stability of the American stock market, the possibility exists that
they might agree to treaty provisions allowing some exchange of in-
formation when securities violations take place. While the Swiss might
not agree to limit the "fiscal matters" principle in cases where insiders
conceal their beneficial ownership of securities in Swiss banks, they
might cooperate in detecting notorious securities violations, such as
those involving fraud or the issuance of bogus stock. In any event, it
is doubtful that the Swiss will agree to cooperate in all situations
where United States securities laws have been violated.
Because of the Swiss desire to insure the integrity of their secrecy
laws, however, a treaty as the immediate solution to the problem seems
unlikely. The lack of progress in negotiations now taking place indi-
cates that the execution of a treaty is not imminent. This is unfortu-
nate because it would reduce the costs associated with the lengthy
and piecemeal investigations now resorted to by United States law
164 See pp. 201-02 supra.
165 Meyer, supra note 39, at 327 n.125.
106 See supra note 14.
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enforcement agencies. Moreover, a treaty, being a bilateral agreement,
would probably not disrupt United States-Swiss relations to the extent
that unilateral action by the United States might. Finally, one definite
disadvantage of a treaty is that it cannot be enforced. The success of
the treaty depends entirely upon the good faith of the signatory
countries.
B. Amending the Securities Laws
Amending the securities laws to deal with some of the problems
presented by Swiss secret accounts is another possible solution that
has been proposed.'87 For example, in 1957 congressional attention
focused on proxy contests in which some industrialists were using Swiss
banks to conceal illegal transactions.'" These industrialists were at-
tempting to control domestic corporations by directing Swiss banks to
purchase stock for their secret accounts. This procedure prevented
management and the investing public from knowing if and by whom
a change of management was being sought. Several congressmen
thought that shareholders had a right to know the identities of those
seeking to acquire control of their corporations,'" and, as a result,
a bill was proposed to amend Section 14 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 175 which regulates the solicitation and giving of proxies.
The bill proposed to require disclosure of the beneficial ownership of
securities as a prerequisite to voting them in a proxy contest.' If
enacted, Swiss banks would have been prevented from voting shares
held in a secret account without disclosing the identity of the owner.
Strong objections to the bill were voiced. It was contended that its
passage would present American brokers with a tremendous admin-
istrative burden.'" American brokers customarily retain record owner-
ship of stock for many of their clients in order to perform such legit-
imate services as transferring stock, collecting dividends, and voting
shares. It was argued that requiring these brokers to publicly reveal
the names of beneficial owners would not only be a hardship on the
brokers, but would also erode the legitimate confidential relationship
between broker and client.'" Furthermore, it was asserted that its
passage might also lead to competition among brokers for certain
customers whose names would otherwise have been held in confi-
dence.' Opponents of the bill also stated that the administration of
167 See, e.g., SEC Legislation Hearings 1 (remarks of Senator Lausche on proxy
rules) ; Foreign Banking Hearing 19 (remarks of Irving M. Pollack on margin reg-
ulations).
1438 See SEC Legislation Hearings 13-37.
109 SEC Legislation Hearings 30 (remarks of Senator Capehart).
170 13 U.S.C. § 78n (1964).
171 See SEC Legislation Hearings 7 for the text of the proposed bill, S. 1601,
introduced by Senator Capehart to amend section 14.
172 Id. at 191 (remarks of Edward T. McCormick, President, American Stock Ex-
change); Fehrenbach 125.
173 S.E.C. Legislation Hearings 176 (remarks of Frank L. Reissner, Chairman, Board
of Governors, Federal Reserve Board).
174 Id. at 195 (remarks of Edward T. McCormick).
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trusts would become unwieldy, for it might be difficult for trustees to
ascertain the names of all the trust beneficiaries.' Another argument
in opposition to the bill was that many beneficial owners might refuse to
execute proxies if they realized their names would be disclosed.'
Thus, corporate meetings might not be convened for lack of a quo-
rum.'" It was also considered doubtful that the rule could be enforced
with respect to foreigners." For example, foreign banks might falsify
the beneficial owner or owners of stock that they vote in proxy con-
tests. Since the bill could not confer any new jurisdictional power on
the SEC, the verification of information received from foreign finan-
cial institutions would still be impossible. For the foregoing reasons,
and because earlier congressional fears that Communists were gaining
control of American defense industries proved unfounded, the bill was
never enacted. 179
During the 1957 Senate hearings on this amendment to section
14, one of the objectives stressed by the State Department was that
any legislation attempting to cope with the Swiss banking problem
should not discriminate against foreign nationals."' The State De-
partment rightfully did not wish to jeopardize existing treaty agree-
ments or to inhibit the "freest possible movement of private capital
across international boundaries.' 19' The Department felt that the
amendment would lead to such a result, and that it might prompt
economic and political retaliation by foreign governments."
It is submitted that amending section 14 would be ineffective to
175 Id. at 14 (remarks of J. Sinclair Armstrong).
178 rd. at 13.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179
 Commenting on the congressional view in 1957 that Communists could infiltrate
American industry through the use of Swiss banks, Fehrenbach stated:
Several facts were presented which cooled Congress off considerably. One was
that exactly one third of 1 percent of all U.S. industrial and rail securities were
held by Swiss banks. This did represent a large amount of money, but it was
a real indication that if the Russians had picked buying control of U.S. industry
as the way to subvert the United States, they still had a long way to go. A Swiss
newspaper blandly pointed out that it might be possible soon for the Communists
to blow up the United States but never to buy it. No Communist had that kind
of money.
Fehrenbach 124.
180
 SEC Legislation Hearings 81 (remarks of Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, Ass't Sec'y
of State for Economic Affairs).
It is apparent that Congress would still abide by this policy today. Representative
Wright Patman, Chairman, Comm. on Banking & Currency, has stressed that discrimina-
tion against foreign nationals is not the intention of those trying to deal with the
problems presented by the secret bank account.
[O]ur activity is confined to prohibiting U.S. citizens and others subject
to our jurisdiction from using secret foreign banking facilities as an element
in illegal schemes. We have constantly emphasized that we are not seeking to
interfere with the domestic policies or statutes of any country.
Letter from Representative Wright Patman to the B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev., Sept. 8,
1969, on file in the Review office.
181 SEC Legislation Hearings 81 (remarks of Thorsten V. Kalijarvi).
182 Id.
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deal with the problem. Aside from the international political ramifica-
tions and anticipated difficulty of enforcement, it would also be an
administrative burden upon the SEC. Finally, it is unlikely that the
present Congress would pass such an amendment which it cursorily
rejected in 1957.
It could be argued that the securities laws should be amended
to prohibit Swiss banks and other foreign financial institutions with
secrecy laws from purchasing and selling shares in United States
securities markets for Americans unless they disclose on whose behalf
they are acting. Such an amendment would entail subjecting those
foreign institutions who are transacting legitimate business to all the
administrative difficulties previously discussed in connection with the
proposed amendment to section 14. Moreover, the SEC would also be
unable to enforce such an amendment. Even if the Swiss banks were
willing to cooperate in this respect, United States citizens could create
secret foreign trusts to act as their agents for the purpose of affecting
securities transactions through Swiss banks. The Swiss banks probably
would not investigate to determine if Americans were the principals
behind such trusts. To require the Swiss banks to undertake the
administrative burdens associated with such an amendment would
constitute discrimination against Switzerland for maintaining a na-
tional policy thoroughly supported by the Swiss people.
It has been suggested that legislation should be passed to prohibit
Swiss banks which have secret accounts from transacting business for
owners of such accounts on United States stock exchanges.'" Such
legislation would be difficult to implement because Swiss banks trans-
act business with American brokers in their own name rather than for
a numbered bank account or accounts.'" To be effective such legis-
lation would necessarily exclude legitimate Swiss business as well as
any illegal business conducted through a secret account. Such legisla-
tion which would place burdensome restrictions on Swiss investments in
the United States, must take into account the substantial influence of
Swiss banks in international monetary affairs and the balance of pay-
ments position of the United States. The Swiss banks, for example,
lent money to the United Kingdom in 1967 in order to support the
British pound.' Swiss banks could likewise sustain confidence in the
dollar. Furthermore, substantial Swiss investment in this country, as
evidenced by the 1968 statistics reviewed earlier, improves the United
States' balance of payments. Thus, such discriminatory legislation
would also have adverse effects on the economy generally.
In some restricted situations, such as where the disclosure of
beneficial ownership of Swiss accounts is not the objective of the
legislation, amending the securities laws, on balance, would prove more
advantageous than harmful. For example, the July 8, 1967 revision of
183 Foreign Banking Hearing 37 (remarks of Representative J. William Stanton).
184 Id. (remarks of Irving M. Pollack).
185 Wechsberg, Banking by the Numbers, Playboy, Aug., 1968, at 90.
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the "special omnibus account" section of Regulation T188 may have
a salutary effect. The new regulation was designed to cope with the
problem of foreign banking institutions extending credit to United
States citizens in excess of the margin requirement of Regulation T.
This amendment, in contradistinction to other proposed statutory and
regulatory solutions, does not discriminate against foreign banks; it
applies to United States brokers as well as foreign banks. The new
regulation requires registration with the SEC as a prerequisite for
using the "special omnibus account." This will not affect the vast
majority of American brokers who have been using the account be-
cause they are already registered with the SEC.'" It will not bar any
foreign financial institution from obtaining the privilege of using the
"special omnibus account."'" But, since registration with the SEC
is now required, and registration would subject Swiss banks to the
scrutiny of the SEC, those Swiss banks previously willing to ignore
margin requirements with respect to United States customers might
prefer to remain unregistered and to forego the privilege of using the
"special omnibus account." The unregistered foreign banks would no
longer get unlimited credit, and would be required, as are ordinary cus-
tomers, to comply with margin requirements on the retail level. As a
result, it is unlikely that unregistered Swiss banks would be financially
capable of extending the amount of credit to United States citizens
which they have in the past.
Registration of brokers with the SEC is required by Section 15
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 189
 Pursuant to this statute the
SEC has established rules governing registration. 19° A foreign bank
wishing to be registered would be required by the rules to submit
statements of financial condition,191 and to designate the SEC as the
agent upon whom process may be served in an action brought in a
188 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(b) (1970). This section provides:
Special omnibus account. In a special omnibus account, a member of a national
securities exchange may effect and finance transactions for another member of a
national securities exchange or a broker or dealer registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission under section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o) from whom the member receives (1) written notice, pur-
suant to a rule of the Securities and Exchange Commission concerning the hy-
pothecation of customers' securities by brokers or dealers (Rule 8c-I (17 C.F.R.
240.8c-1) or Rule 15c2-1 (17 C.FR. 240.15c2-I)), to the effect that all securities
carried in the account will be carried for the account of the customers of the
broker or dealer and (2) written notice that any short sales effected in the
account will be short sales made in behalf of the customers of the broker or
-dealer other than his partners. No substitutions of collateral securing credit ex-
tended to a broker or dealer not described in the preceding sentence shall be
permitted after October 6, 1969, and no such credit shall be maintained after
July 8, 1970. (Emphasis added.)
187 Current CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep., 	 77,717, at 83,640-41 (press release of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, June 6, 1969).
188 Id. (by implication).
189 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1964).
190 See 17 C.F.R. § 240,15b14 to 15b10-7 (1968).
191 17 C.F.R. § 240.15bI-2 (1968).
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United States court.'" Certain records would also have to be main-
tained.'" It is doubtful if any of the less reputable Swiss banks, or
even those that have in the past voluntarily adhered to United
States margin regulations, would choose to become registered, as
this would provide the SEC greater control over them. Failing regis-
tration, margin requirements must be met on the retail level. If
the margin accounts maintained by these unregistered Swiss banks
become undermargined, margin calls'" will prevent excessive forced
selling. The rules of the stock exchanges require a broker to sell under-
margined securities if the shareholder's equity drops below a certain
minimum and if the customer has not provided additional collateral.'"
Therefore, Swiss banks refusing to register with the SEC would, being
subject to the aforementioned rules in most cases, have to put up
additional collateral when their accounts became undermargined. They
probably would not tie up their own capital as such an unregistered
status would necessitate, but would require their customers to more
closely adhere to United States margin regulations. Thus, United
States citizens using Swiss banks will probably be required by these
banks to adhere to the existing margin requirement. Consequently, the
dangers from undermargined accounts of pyramiding credit in a rising
market and of forced sales in a falling market will be mitigated.
This amendment to the "special omnibus account" regulations will
not solve the basic .problem confronting the SEC regarding secret
Swiss bank accounts—the determination of the identity of the account
holder when a securities violation is suspected or known to have been
committed. Amending the securities laws does not appear to be an
effective, practical or diplomatic approach to the problem of ascer-
taining the beneficial owners of Swiss bank accounts. The securities
laws, by and large, are effective as presently structured, and can
protect the investing public if discovery processes are available to
the SEC so that the identities of violators can be determined. The .
basic problem is investigatory and evidentiary in nature; it is a prob-
lem which cannot be solved by amendments to the statutes.
C. Enforcing and Amending Domestic Banking Regulations
It has been indicated that in many of the crimes perpetrated
through the secret Swiss account, 75 percent of the transactions are
carried out in the United States, and that information relating to these
domestic transactions, such as bank and brokerage records, are very
helpful to law enforcement officers.'" Several ways of procuring more
domestic information have been proposed.
First, it has been observed that many United States banks are
lax in administering monthly reports required by Treasury Regula-
192 17 C.F.R. § 240.1561-5 (1968).
193 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-6 (1968).
194 For discussion of "margin calls," see 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1266 (2d ed.,
1961).
195 N.Y.S.E. Rule 431.
196 Foreign Banking Hearing 27 (remarks of Robert Morgenthau).
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tions. 07
 As a result, persons have been able to deposit large amounts
in United States banks to the credit of Swiss bank accounts without
being adequately identified by the banks.'" False names have been
given to the banks by depositors thereby frustrating subsequent inves-
tigations."' It has been suggested that the feasibility of demanding
closer adherence by banks in the administration of the required
monthly reports be investigated.'"
These Treasury Currency Reports must be filed by each financial
institution in the United States with the district Federal Reserve
Bank.201
 Deposits or withdrawals effected by or through such financial
institutions must be reported under the following circumstances:
a. Transactions involving $2500 or more of United
States currency in denominations of $100 or higher;
b. Transactions involving $10,000 or more of United
States currency in any denominations; and
c. Transactions involving any amount in any denom-
inations, which in the judgment of the financial institution
exceed those commensurate with the customary conduct of
the business, industry or profession of the person or organi-
zation concerned. "2
An additional requirement imposed on the reporting institutions is
that of identification:
No financial institution shall effect any transaction with
respect to which a report is required unless the person or
organizations with whom such transaction is to be effected
has been satisfactorily identified. 2° 3 (Emphasis added.)
Noncompliance with these regulations subjects the institutions to
criminal sanctions.' Nevertheless, some banks have failed to follow
these regulations, thus eliminating an opportunity to obtain informa-
tion that could be helpful to the SEC in tracing securities laws vi-
olators.
Moreover, if depositors know that they will be required to pro-
duce adequate identification, they may be deterred from using the
secret Swiss account for illegal purposes. They could, of course, still
go to neighboring countries to place money in Swiss accounts or could
employ a Swiss bank representative to transfer money for them. How-
ever, stricter enforcement of the Treasury Currency Reports would
make evasion of the securities laws from within the United States
more difficult.
197 Id. at 28.
198 Id. at 15.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 28.
201 See 31 C.F.R. § 102.1 et seq. (1969).
202 31 C.F.R. § 102.1 (1969).
293 31	 § 102.3 (1969).
204 12 U.S.C. § 95a (1964).
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In conjunction with demanding stricter compliance with the ad-
ministration of these reports, it has been suggested that persons trans-
ferring substantial funds to secret Swiss accounts through United
States banks be photographed." Thus, even if a false name or iden-
tification were presented to the bank, some evidence would still be
available. This procedure would again make using the secret account
for illegal purposes more difficult and might therefore further deter
potential violators.
Another aid for the SEC and the Justice Department in securities
violations' investigations has been the utilization of microfilmed copies
of checks.' Most American banks ordinarily microfilm checks; how-
ever, because of the administrative burden and expense involved, some
banks have abandoned this practice, 207 thus eliminating a potential
source of evidence. Since many of the transactions associated with the
use of the secret Swiss account take place in the United States, the mi-
crofilmed copies of checks are useful to government investigators in
tracing these transactions. 205 Without these microfilmed copies avail-
able, the SEC's job will be more difficult. Consideration has therefore
been given to the practicality of requiring all banks to microfilm
checks." Aside from considerations of added cost, this proposal war-
rants impleffientation, at least in cases where the bank is required to
include a record of the transaction in its Treasury Currency Report.
Insuring greater compliance by the banks with the Treasury
Currency Reports regulations and passing regulations requiring banks
to microfilm checks and photograph depositors, at least in cases where
transactions involving Swiss accounts might be involved, appear to be
the most practical solutions to the Swiss banking problem. 21° The mon-
2°9 Foreign Banking Hearing 28 (remarks of Robert Morgenthau).
200 Id. at 27.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 27-28.
[If microfilming] is stopped it is going to be a problem in being able to trace
transactions even to the extent we have already been able to do, because . . .
in many cases as soon as the money goes over to Switzerland it comes right
back. It may go into a New York depository of a Swiss bank and then will go
to a brokerage firm and so forth, and we can pick up a great deal of that trans-
action through American records. But if microfilming every check is no longer
continued it will be a serious disadvantage to the Government and the public
interest.
Id.
209 Id. at 28.
210 Legislation designed to overcome some of the difficulties presented to law en-
forcement officers investigating activities in which the secret foreign account is involved
and to deter those who illegally utilize such accounts was introduced in the House of
Representatives on Dec. 3, 1969 by Representative Wright Patman, Chairman, Comm.
on Banking & Currency. This bill, H.R. 15073, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), would
require banks in the United States to maintain certain records, would provide additional
authority to the Secretary of the Treasury for the purpose of requiring reports con-
cerning transactions in United States currency, and would also require that United
States citizens or persons doing business in the United States with foreign financial
agencies report such transactions.
Title I of the bill concerns itself with bank records in the United States. Chapter
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etary cost of these proposals and the administrative burdens which
they may entail bear examination. If a survey reveals that these
proposals are economically feasible and could be implemented without
1 would amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act for the purpose of aiding authorities
conducting lawful investigations. It would prevent the premature destruction of certain
types of evidence highly useful in criminal and civil actions by granting authority to
the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations requiring each insured bank to main-
tain records relating to the identities of account holders, to make photocopies or other
copies of checks and drafts presented for payment or received for deposit, and to keep
records with respect to the identity of the party for whose account checks are to be
deposited or collected. The banks would also be required to record the identifications
of persons making deposits or withdrawals when such transactions involve foreign banks
or stipulated amounts of United States currency. Based on congressional findings that
regulation of the banking industry by the federal government is necessary and proper,
Chapter 2 of Title I would extend the record-keeping requirements to uninsured banks.
To insure compliance, the Secretary is authorized to seek injunctive relief. Additionally
stiff civil and criminal penalties are provided for violations.
Title II of the bill is named the "Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting
Act." Among its purposes is aiding "duly constituted authorities in lawful investigations"
and in collecting statistics helpful in formulating monetary and economic policy. Chapter
2 of Title II authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to require from banks, brokers, and
other financial institutions, reports of transactions involving United States currency.
Such reports as the Secretary may require are to be submitted both by the financial
institution involved and other parties participating in the transaction. These reports
must identify the names of the person or persons involved in the transaction.
Chapter 3 of Title II requires persons transporting, whether as principal, agent,
or bailee, certain amounts of currency into or out of places subject to United States
jurisdiction to file reports. Persons receiving certain amounts of currency in places sub-
ject to United States jurisdiction directly from places not subject to United States
jurisdiction are also required to file reports. The amounts requiring reportage are: (1)
amounts greater than $5000 on any occasion, or (2) an aggregate amount of $10,000
per calendar year. The reports are to contain such information as: (1) the legal capacity
of the filer, (2) the origin, destination, and route of the currency, (3) the identities of
the persons to whom the . currency is delivered and/or from whom the currency is re-
ceived, and (4) the amounts involved. Failure to report or misstating or omitting in-
formation may result in forfeiture and seizure of the funds.
Chapter 4 of Title II requires United States citizens, residents, or persons doing
business in the United States, who engage in transactions directly or indirectly with
foreign financial agencies which do not make their records available to United States
law enforcement officials with respect to transactions involving United States citizens,
residents, or persons doing business in the United States, to file reports including the
following information in such detail as required by the Secretary of the Treasury: (1)
the identities of the parties to the transaction; (2) their legal capacities and, if applicable,
the real parties in interest, and (3) a description of the transaction.
The penalties for failing to comply with the requirements of Title II are listed in
Chapter 1. These include the availability of injunctive relief to the Secretary of the
Treasury and criminal penalties of a fine of $1000 or one year imprisonment, or both.
If the violation is committed in furtherance of another violation of Federal law or is
part of a pattern of illegal activity involving transactions of $100,000 or more within
a year, the fine and prison sentences authorized are $500,000 and five years. Immunity
from prosecution as a result of self-incrimination for witnesses is also granted.
The fact that this proposed bill requires the microfilming of necessary checks and
expands the requirements for currency reporting should provide more evidence of
illegal activity involving secret accounts. The measures which require more stringent
identifications of persons involved in depositing sums to the credit of secret accounts
and the stiffer penalties involved in the failure of both individuals and financial institu-
tions to make required reports should deter many potential violators of the securities
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lengthy delay, regulations should be promulgated. The advantage of
these proposals is that they are unlikely to cause any international
political problems. The Swiss, understandably, would not welcome
outside interference with their banking practices; by the same token,
they could not justifiably object to the United States taking action
within its jurisdiction to strengthen its own banking affairs.
CONCLUSION
Improving evidence-gathering techniques in the United States is
the best short-term step that can be taken to reduce securities laws vi-
olations encouraged by Swiss banking secrecy. Evidentiary measures,
such as greater adherence by banks to the proper standards for admin-
istering Treasury Currency Reports, are capable of being implemented
without much delay. Such measures can be taken by the United States
without the acquiescence of foreign governments and with little likeli-
hood of provoking retaliatory action. Not only will such measures
aid the SEC and the Justice Department investigations by providing a
potential source of evidence of securities violations, they will also tend
to make it more difficult for persons to employ the secret account for
illegal purposes.
Changing the securities laws through amendments would be of
only limited effectiveness, since the problem is basically evidentiary.
Any such legislation would probaby require treating foreign nationals
in a discriminatory fashion and might result in undesirable diplomatic
and economic effects.
The outlook for securing an effective treaty to aid the SEC also
appears dim. If one is negotiated, it probably will be only after con-
siderable delay and may not be effective against all types of securities
laws violations. Since Switzerland will sign no treaty requiring it to
provide assistance in "fiscal matters," the possibility that any negotiated
treaty would be fully effective is doubtful. Nevertheless, negotiations
should not be abandoned, as some areas may be established in which
the Swiss will cooperate. Swiss interest in the stability of American
securities markets, coupled with United States diplomatic pressure,
might encourage Switzerland to pass legislation exempting certain
securities transactions from the umbrella provided by the "fiscal
matters" doctrine.211 Such considerations might also induce the Swiss
laws. But, whether this proposed bill will deter one who is determined to make illegal use
of the secret account, such as a person who does not use United States' financial institu-
tions as a conduit, is debatable. If such an individual manages to get money out of the
country and into a secret Swiss account without detection, the bill will be of little help
to law enforcement officials in their efforts to penetrate the secrecy of the Swiss bank.
By and large, however, this bill should have a salutary effect if enacted into Iaw.
211 Diplomatic pressure and publicity about the illegal use of Swiss accounts could
reduce violations. For instance, after the widely publicized proxy battles that took place
in 1957, the Swiss Banker's Association attempted to protect their image from damage
by American corporate raiders. Fehrenbach states:
But the hearings, acrimony, and extremely bad publicity taught the Swiss Banker's
Association something. It took steps to keep its members from being used by
American stock manipulators. It further made a hard-and-fast rule that all Swiss
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to make it more difficult for foreign banks to become established in
Switzerland. Such banks have generally been less circumspect in ac-
cepting deposits from unreliable sources than the older, firmly estab-
lished Swiss owned banks. Therefore, the negotiations for a treaty
could be an important long-term factor in solving the many faceted
problems generated by the secret Swiss bank account.
WILLIAM H. Is
banks voting American shares in proxy fights would invariably vote for manage-
ment unless specifically instructed otherwise. After 1957, no Swiss bank know-
ingly allowed itself to become involved in an American corporate proxy battle.
Fehrenbach 125.
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